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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
othenvisc have been adversely affected. Mortgagees were provided with a
means of extending their liens by registration, there being no necessity for
court proceedings as in the invalid Pennsylvania law. The most serious
problem is the applicability of Article III, section 33 of the Florida Con-
stitution. But, the court has indicated that this provision would not be
applicable where no prior statute of limitation existed. Further, in Mahood
v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., the concurring justice expressed the view that
that constitutional provision is satisfied if a reasonable time is provided for
the enforcement of existing claims. In view of these opinions, it seems un-
likely that the Florida statutes will meet a fate of being declared unconstitu-
tional as did their Pennsylvania counterpart.
HERBEiRT A. WARREN
THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF THE RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP
IN JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
There is considerable uncertainty as to whether the survivor of a joint
bank account or the personal representative of the deceased should receive
the funds of a joint account. The question has been clouded, so far as the
layman is concerned, by the adoption in nearly every state of "Deposit in
Two-Name" statutes.' Laymen are of the opinion that when they sign a
bank signature card, as demanded by these statutes, providing that the
funds are payable to either or survivor, they have made all the arrangements
for their co-depositor to receive the funds upon death. Actually, these
statutes merely protect the bank in case of payment to the survivor after
the death of the joint depositor.
It is proposed to show, first, the modern theories used in deciding
whether or not the survivor of a joint 'ccount will receive the account;
secondly, the problem as it exists under the Florida decisions; and thirdly,
a suggestion as to how Florida might clarify the joint account dilemma.
When the common law was first formulating in England, personal
property was of relatively little importance. Men of wealth had many acres
of land, but only a few personal effects. As a result the law of the time was
predominantly concerned with realty. Real property could be held in four
different ways: in severalty, in joint-tenancy, in coparcenary and in coin-
mon.2 Each of these theories had requirements which had to be met before
the estate could have legal effect.8 One of the primary reasons for deter-
mining the type of estate that existed was to establish the rights of survivor-
I. Every state except Kentucky has "Deposit in Two-Name Acts." See, e.g., FLA.
SrAT. § 653.16 (1949). These acts provide that the signing of a signature card, which
states that the account is payable to X or Y o survivor, protects the bank ill paying
the survivor after the death of a joint depositor.
2. 2 BL. CONIM. '343
3. Ibid.
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ship.4 These estates and interests were generally not recognized in the law
of personal property.' This distinction has now been repudiated, and it is
conceded that the same estates and interests may be created in relation to
personal property, tangible or intangible, as are permissible in the law of
real property.6
Modern day. courts use gift, trust, joint-tenancy and contract theories to
justify their holding in joint deposit problems.7 No matter which theory is
used, the court's primary concern is to determine the intent of the deposit-
or.6 There must have been an intention to transfer a present interest to the
surviving co-depositor, in order for him to receive the funds.' Otherwise,
the representative of the deceased will be entitled to the deposit.10
The gift theory has been a favorite of the courts in giving effect to
to the intent of the deceased, It has, however, presented some difficulty,
since it requires the. showing of an intent to give' 1 and a delivery.' 2 The
mere fact that an account has been opened in a form payable to joint
depositors with right of survivorship does not of itself establish an intent
to make a gift. 13 The donee may not get a present interest in the account
and, in that event, the gift would be void as a violation of the statute of
wills, being an attempted testamentary disposition.1' But, if the depositor
intends to make a present gift of an interest in a deposit, and delivers the
bank book to the donee, a valid gift is effected.
1"
Some courts are prone to be rather strict as to .the requirement that
there be a delivery of the intended gift to the donee.' e Other courts give
effect to the gift if they can find a clear intent to make a gift. 7 It would
4. See In re Conldin's Estate, 259 App. Div. 432, 20 N.Y.S.2d 59, 62 (3d Dep't
1940) (survivorship exists where a person becomes entitled to property by reason of his
having survived another person who had an interest in it).
5. BL. CoMm. 342 (Gavit's ed. 1941).
6. Ibid.
7. E.g., Raftery v. Reilly, 41 R.I. 47, 102 Ati. 711 (1918) (gift); Coburn v.
Shilling, 138 Md. 177, 113 AtI. 761 (1922) (trust); Compton v. Hendricks, 154 Ga.
808, 115 S.E. 654 (1923) (joint-tenancy); Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank,
222 Mass. 499, 111 N.E. ;71 (1916) (contract).
8. Sinift v. Sinift, 229 Iowa 56, 293 N.W. 841 (1940).
9. Ball v. Forbes, 314 Mass. 200, 49 N.E.2d 898 (1943).
10. Gibson v. Industrial Bank of Washington, 36 A.2d 62 (Munic. Ct. D.C. 1944);
Long v. Dempsey, 52 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
11. The Kitty C., 20 F. Supp. 173 (S.D. Fla. 1937).
12. Jones v. Ferguson, 150 Fla. 313, 7 So.2d 464 (1942).
13. Thomas v. Houston, 181 N.C. 91, 106 S.E. 466 (1921); Sawyer v. Mabus, 107
S.C. 369, 92 S.E. 1029 (1917).
14. In re King's Will. 51 Misc. 375, 101 N.Y. Supp. 279 (Sur. Ct. 1906); Sulli-
van v. Sullivan, 39 App. Div. 99, 56 N.Y. Supp. 693 (3d Dep't 1899) aff'd. 161 N.Y.
554, 56 N.E. 116 (1900); Jonte v. English, 171 Okla. 291, 40 P.2d 646 (1935); Ono.
frey v. Wolliver, 351 Pa. 18, 40 A.2d 35 (1944).
15. Raftery v. Reilly, 41 R.I. 47, 102 Atd. 711 (1918).
16. Hudson v. Bradley, 176 Ark. 853, 4 S.W.2d 534 (1928); First & Tri-State
National Bank and Trust Co. v. Caywood, 95 Ind. App. 591, 176 N.E. 871 (1931);
Thomas v. Houston, 181 N.C91, 106 S.E. 466 (1921).
17. In re lohns6n' sEsate 218 N.W. 739 (Neb. 1928).
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seem, however, that the donee must at least know of the gift during the
lifetime of the donor.'8
Under the contract theory, which has been applied mainly by Massa-
chusetts courts,19 when co-depositors sign a bank signature card, a contract
is made between the parties, as well as with the bank. This theory has
been used closely in connection with the joint-tenancy theory. The con-
tract with the bank is held to create a joint-tenancy where there is technic-
.ally no joint-tenancy.20 The reasoning appears fallacious in that the contract
is actually between the bank and the co-depositors, and there is no contract
between the co-depositors themselves. It would seem that the contract
theory should be used only where there is a written contract between the
joint depositors, separate and distinct from the contract with the bank.
Some courts follow tie joint-tenancy theory to vest title in survivors
of joint depositors. However, this theory causes difficulty because it re-
quires unities of time, title, interest and possession.2 Numerous courts
have denied recovery when these requisites have not been met.22 But where
the parties have definitely shown in their contract that they intended a
joint-tenancy with right of survivorship, it has been given effect and the
survivor held entitled to the fund.
23
The trust theory is disliked by some courts because it seems that it is
used only to effectuate an imperfect gift. 2' The right of the survivor will
be sustained only when there is a declaration of trust, so that the equitable
title vests in the cestui que trust and passes beyond the control of the
settlor. "  It is admitted in some cases that the opening of an account in
the joint names of donor and another is evidence of an intention to estab-
lish a trust, but such intention may be rebutted. 0 Since co-depositors in
a joint bank account can draw upon the account at will, it is impossible
to prove a true trust unless the power of revocation, through ability to with-
draw all the funds of the account, is not exercised during the lifetime of the
creator of the trust.
27
The law as to the right of a survivor to the money on deposit in a joint
bank account has been and still is quite unsettled in Florida. Very few
18. Pcrry v. Lmveroni, 252 Mass. 390, 147 N.E. 826 (1925).
19. Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 11I N.E. 371 (1916).
20. Goldston v. Randolph, 293 Mass. 253, 199 N.E. 896 (1936) (a transfer and
.signature card gave the survivor a right to the account even though the transfer appeared
testamentary in character).
21. Neal v. Neal, 106 S.\V.2d 595 (Ark. 1937); lcard v. Gundy, 127 Me. 480,
H14 Atl. 399 (1929); Portland National Baink v. Brooks, 126 Me. 251, 137 AtI. 641
(1927)
22. Denigan v. San Francisco Savings Union, 127 Cal. 142, 59 Pac. 390 (1899),
Staples v. Berry, 110 Mc. 32, 85 Atl. 303 (1912); Bumns v. Nolette, 83 N.H!. 489,
144 Atl. 848 (1929).
23. Compton v. Hlledricks, 154 Ga. 808, 115 S.E. 654 (1923); Erwin v. Fctter,
283 II. 16, 119 N.E. 926 (1918).
24. lowatd v. Dingley, 122 Me. 5, 118 At!. 529 (1922).
2i. Nurphy v. llaynes, 197 Ky. 444, 247 S.\V. '362 (192").
26. Coburn v. Shilling, 138 \d. 177, 113 At. 761 (1922).
27. Ladner v. Laducr. 128 Miss. 75, 90 So. 593 (1921).
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cases have been decided directly on point. The iitent of the deceased
seems to be the controlling factor, and this intent may be supported by any
one of the four previously discussed theories.
In one case 28 the Florida court held that even though the joint depos-
itors were husband and wife, with a resultant estate by the entirety, the
money should go to the son as executor rather than to the wife. The court
based its opinion on the theory that in order for the wife to receive the
money, a gift to her by the husband had to be established. Since the intent
of the husband in opening the account was merely to allow the wife to meet
current obligations, the requisites of a gift, an intent to give and a delivery,
were not present.
This was followed by an interpretation of the Florida law in a federal
court. The case20 involved the construction of a Florida statute30 modifying
the common law of joint-tenancy with right of survivorship. Two women
were the joint depositors and they had signed a written agreement at the
time of the deposit, to the effect that they agreed with each other and
with the bank that all sums theretofore or thereafter deposited in the joint
account by either party should be owned by both jointly, with right of
survivorship. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the survivor had a
right to take title to the money as against the administratrix. The mere
signing of a bank signature card would not have been sufficient,2 ' since
that would simply have complied with the statute to protect the bank in
case of payment to the survivor after the death of one of the depositors.-2
In a concurring opinion, Judge Russell noted that, in the absence of stat-
ute,18 a gift might not have been effectuated, since entire dominion over
the account would not have been relinquished. He also questioned the
creation of a joint-tenancy under the statute since he felt that joint-tenancy
does not exist when one party can withdraw all the funds at any time. l
stated that he would strike down the agreement as being a testamentary
28. Jones v. Ferguson, 150 Fla. 313, 7 So.2d 464 (1942). Contra. Bailey v. Smith,
89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925) (a savings bank deposit which the parties held as an
estate by the entirety was given to the surviving husband, notwithstanding a contrary
provision in the will of the deccased wifc).
29. Lynch v. Murray, 139 F.2d 6-9 (5th Cir. 1943).
30. FLA. STATr. § 689.15 (1949) ("[he doctrine of the right of survivorship ill
cases of real estate and personal property held by joint tenants shall not prevail in this
state; that is to say, except in cases of estates by entiretyv, a dcvisc, transfer or con Veyancc
heretofore or hereafter made to two or more sIhall creat2 a tenancy in coinnion, untess
the instrument creating the estate shall expressi!' provide for the right of survivorship:
and in cases of estates by entirety, the tenants, upon divorce, shall become tenants ill
common.")
31. Cerny v. Cerny, 152 Fla. 333, 11 So.2d 777 (1943); Crossnan v. Napltali,
160 Fla. 148, 33 So,2d 726 (1948).
32. FLA. STAT. § 653.16 ("When a deposit has been made, or shall hereaftcr be
made, in any ...banking inistitution transacting business in this state, in the names of
two or more persons, payable to either, or payable to Cithe2 or tle survivor, such deposit.
or any part thereof, or any interest or dividend thereon, may be paid to either of said
persons whether the other or others be living or not; and the receipt or acquittance of
the person so paid shall be valid and SufficiCt releaC aLnld discharge to said iistittioilm
for any payment so made.").
33. See note 30 supra.
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disposition, without the formality of a will, except for the fact that a Flor-
ida case has allowed the survivor to take under such a written "contract".
3
4
This concurring opinion clearly shows the precariousness in Florida of
trying to establish a right of survivorship in a joint account without a writ-
ten contract other than the statutory bank signature card.
A 1945 case 5 leaves no doubt but that the joint-tenancy, gift, trust
and contract theories will be considered by the Florida courts. The deceased
had opened several accounts in which he had included another name along
with his own, and in which he had designated who was to take in case of
his death. His manner of opening the accounts left no doubt as to the
fact that he intended his survivors to take. No written contracts had been
entered into between the deceased and the survivors, nor were any bank
signature cards signed by the survivors. The court held that, since none of
the various theories could be established, they had no power under equitable
principles to decree the deposits to be the property of the survivor, merely
because such was the intent of the deceased.
Although Florida has refused to hold that the signing of a bank sig-
nature card creates a joint-tenancy with right of survivorship,36 the court
has partially reversed that position in a ease involving joint depositors who
were mother and daughter. It is to be doubted whether this latest case
37
would be authority for holding that the signing of a bank signature card
would create a joint-tenancy with right of survivorship unless the parties
were close blood relatives.
It is submitted that the following statements would probably be valid
in connection with the right of survivorship in joint bank accounts in
Florida:
1. When opening a joint bank account the joint depositors, in
addition to signing the bank signature card, should also execute a contract
between themselves, stating that it is the intention of the parties to create
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, and not a tenancy in common.
2. When the survivor of a joint account is a close relative of the
deceased co-depositor, and a signature card has been signed, the Florida
courts will probably hold that the survivor should take, under the contract
theory. Any available favorable evidence as to the intent of the deceased
should, however, be presented.
3. When the survivor of a joint account is not a close relative of the
deceased co-depositor it is necessary to establish that a gift, trust, joint-
tenancy, or contract was created. The intent of the deceased in such a case
is an extremely important factor and the supporting evidence must be al-
most conclusive. Of course, a written contract, as suggested above, will be
34. Cerny v. Cerny, 152 Fla. 333, 11 So.2d 777 (1943).
35. Webster v. St. Petersburg Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 155 Fla. 412, 20
So.2d 400 (1945).
36. Crossman v. Naphtali, 160 Fla. 148, 33 So.2d 726 (1948).
37. Crabtree v. Garcia, 43 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1949).
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given effect by the courts but, in the absence of such a contract, it would
seem best to proceed under the gift theory.
Thq only true solution would appear to be legislative action. Such
legislation should require that a contract between the parties be include4
by the banks on their signature cards. It could be in substantially the fol-
lowing form: "I (do) (do not) wish this account to be a joint-tenancy
with right of survivorship." This statement would be followed by a space
for the signature of both- parties. Such legislation would in no way increase
the banks' liability but it would save the courts from handling much need-
less litigation.
GEORGE RicHARD sON, JR.
